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*Right taken to  
Washington 5/4/54*

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

RELEASE *IN FULL*

3 May 1954

2003

MEMORANDUM FOR: C/P

SUBJECT : Frank G. Wisner's Memorandum of 28 April 1954 Regarding  
Cover and Deception

1. The reference memorandum covers numerous practical and feasible lines of deception approach. The attempts to implicate the Dominican Republic, Venezuela, etc., are "naturals" and all have a high degree of plausibility because of the past interest of these countries in the Guatemalan problem. These lines should therefore be pursued.

2. However, these projects have their limitations in the sense that the Dominican Republic, Venezuela and certainly Nicaragua are our "friends," to the extent that they side with us in vigorous anti-Communism. Some consideration should therefore be given to their "plausible denial" situations too, since we are so extremely concerned about ours. It will not be particularly to our advantage to be found associated with Dominican and Venezuelan "interventionists," and to know that we have tarred our own associates.

3. What this leads up to is a proposal to exert our best efforts for the implication of that great and good friend of the United States, Juan Domingo Peron. Peron's implication is entirely logical, since he is anti-Communist, wants to dominate the Hemisphere and has an established record of interference in internal Guatemalan affairs (through a very clumsy labor attache). Some of the steps in this plan might be as follows:

a. Luis Coronada Lira, CALLIGERIS confidant, will be in Buenos Aires on 8 May, on behalf of SUMMIT. Pegged on this circumstance, press speculation can be engendered to the effect that there is really much more to Lira's visit and that he is negotiating with Peron.

b. Denials of this story can be expected or induced from Lira, CALLIGERIS and the Argentines themselves.

c. By now, the story should be ready for pick-up in the Guatemalan press. The independent press can recall the attempts of the Argentinian labor attache to influence the Guatemalan labor situation.

d. ERRATIC could be sent to Argentina. The new case officer in Salvador, WELLBANK, could explain to ERRATIC that he, WELLBANK, was a patriotic American and loved the U.S., but that the U.S. non-intervention policy drove him almost to political despair. WELLBANK could explain that the JUVIAS had had to

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temporize with ERRATIC because it was impossible to get U.S. support. Now he, WELLBANK, had come to the decision that it was so important, for the U.S., that Guatemalan Communism be destroyed that private men of good will would have to do the job, even without the support of the U.S. Government. WELLBANK should therefore offer to finance a trip to Buenos Aires for ERRATIC, on the basis that Peron was the most powerful anti-Communist in the hemisphere next to the United States. It is presumed that, given ERRATIC's natural vanity and skillful salesmanship on WELLBANK's part, ERRATIC will rise to the bait.

e. Similarly, LIBETHENITE-4 could be sent to Argentina.

f. Based on the above, documentary evidence of Argentine complicity could be produced. Alternatively, Argentine letters to CALLIGERIS could tie Peron in with the successful movement, and this might be preferable to a tie-in only with the failures like LIBETHENITE-4 and ERRATIC.